ShackF00

I recently attended a training class for certification as a payment card assessor. I came away from that training session with quite a bit more than just the 3-letter acronym for the certification, and I wanted to share some insights and opinions (of course).

• First, let me say that the course was atrocious. Horrible. Here’s why: the instructor. Not the material, per se (although there is a lot of room for improvement), but the instructor and his teaching style. He had no style. He was dry, he was stumped on questions at least 10 times per day, and he offered no real-world examples or concrete guidance that attendees could truly benefit from.
• The guidance overall was very literal in some areas, but usually vague. So assessors leaving this class are not getting a lot of “lessons learned” or “here is the best way to do this or look at this” kind of advice.
• The range of backgrounds and skill sets in the class were as varied as I’ve ever seen. This could be viewed as a positive OR a negative, depending on your perspective, but the frightening thing was the very obvious lack of knowledge some folks had, and some of the questions asked were flat out stupid. Yes, I said it, and I mean to be a bit derogatory. If you are asking some of the questions I heard in this class, you need to be studying up for Security+ at best.
• The test was easy. Really easy.

What’s the take away? Well, I have some thoughts, maybe a little advice. Here goes.

First, we really need to start interviewing payment card assessors.

Ask for resumes. Do an actual interview. Ask about real experience with the same technologies in use within the organization. If you don’t like someone, or don’t feel they are a good fit, ASK FOR SOMEONE ELSE or TALK TO A DIFFERENT CONSULTING FIRM! Why is this hard?!

Second, do not let a non-technical manager do the interview or make the call alone. In fact, as some of you know, I am not a fan of “GRC fanboys” running security teams in general, as they tend to be full of shit. “governance blah blah blah” and “controls blah blah blah” do not a true security architecture make. I have about had it with folks who hide behind “frameworks” and paperwork. If the audit team or compliance team makes the decision (and they tend to be a little less technical overall), ensure technical folks are involved to help call BS on would-be assessors who roll buzzword-style.

Third, ask for samples.

Although no one is going to share a formal compliance report with you, some examples of audit reports and writing should be available for assessors and consulting firms. IF they won’t provide this, just move on. Don’t waste your time.

The term “enemy” is probably a little strong. However, there is really almost no standardization here. You’re on your own to validate someone’s credentials, and it is obvious to me that consulting firms are hiring some very “green” or less experienced people to do this work. Don’t fall victim to these people, as they can have a huge impact on your business and compliance programs.

A final note: One class attendee, who can only be described as a douchebag, actually described himself as a “Master Security Architect”. If you have any desire to get respect from your peers, or maintain the semblance of a social life, do not ever refer to yourself as a “Master Security Architect”. Gawd.

Information Security

I have been insanely underwater for the last 2 weeks, so haven’t posted anything despite my best intentions. I am still buried, but wanted to post a short note about RSA next week. I will be there all week, and I’m looking forward to meeting up with everyone. I am still planning my agenda in terms of specific talks to attend, but at first glance there’s some awesomeness, and here’s what I want to check out just in terms of topics:

• Data breach lessons learned: We need more “from the trenches” stories and data, and I personally will be looking for more of these.
• Shifts in security technology: In particular, advances in DLP and movement toward application whitelisting and away from traditional “blacklist” AV.
• Advances in virtualization and cloud: I would like to see some good, definitive solutions and thoughts here this year instead of mostly hype. I think I will, since I know things are progressing in the industry.
• New directions in compliance and privacy/breach notification: Just to keep up, more than anything.

I’ll also be scouring the vendor area for good info, too – last year was wretched. Just nothing new or interesting that grabbed my attention, not to mention the lack of people at the conference in general.

See you there!

Musings

So, much like any other security consultant, I see a lot of the same things across organizations with regard to information security. Some good, some not so good, some horrifying. Here’s a succinct list of the top 5 things I see consistently which I believe contributes to infosec program suckage.

1. Politics: If the security organization is impotent due to political issues, and has no a) budget, b) support from executives and business unit management, and c) plan, it is very likely doomed to failure.
2. Lack of monitoring capabilities: We need more eyes and ears. From NIDS to HIDS to File Integrity Monitoring to Network Flow Analysis to Log Management, we need a better approach to what is happening in the environment. Not only that, but too many organizations buy stuff and forget about it – if you don’t have daily SOPs around your monitoring tools and capabilities, you will end up with shelfware, and that just sucks.
3. Lack of technical skills: Way too many infosec folks are happy to slap that “CISSP” on their business cards or email signatures. Great. Can you actually DO anything though? I truly feel that a base skillset for anyone in infosec operations has to include some scripting, firewall and router ACL creation and management, a grasp on scanning and vulnerability management, patching and configuration management skills, reading and understanding packets, and responding to incidents. Sure, there are specialties. But who gives a $*@ about your cutting edge Appsec skills when no one on the team can even lock down a box appropriately? C’mon. And you managers who hide behind “policy” and “governance” and go to 10 meetings a day to keep looking busy? Heh – chances are you suck. The day is coming when you will, and should be, obsolete. Yeah, we’re all trying to be better “business people”, but you still need to have a technical skill set to even PRETEND to keep up with this game.
4. Focus on the “cutting edge”: Got Web app firewalls? DLP? Awesome! But if you have no system hardening program, or lack a robust patch management process, you are really missing the boat. It’s been consistently proven that the basics like patching and config management, when implemented and maintained rigorously, could have stopped a vast percentage of data breaches. One exception – the time for whitelisting has come. Death to blacklist AV!
5. Managing to compliance: Sad to say, but I have seen this really emerge in the last 3-4 years. Organizations are stopping at the check box. And that’s a tragedy, since we all know that compliance != security. I say that with a hint of sarcasm, since it’s pretty damn obvious that we all DON’T know this, or people wouldn’t be doing things this way.

Not a complete list, at all. Just the major things I see consistently across organizations in pretty much every vertical.

Information Security

I’ve been thinking about governance a lot lately, probably since I’ve been working with consulting clients at various stages of security dysfunction, and it has become OBVIOUS that governance plays a big role in how security “gets done”. This is not a new debate – most of us in the security industry have worked at a variety of organizations, some of which report to a genuine CISO or CSO, others who report to a VP of IT or CIO, some who just “float” in the IT department or elsewhere. Here’s my general feeling today, though, and it may come as a surprise to some:

Information Security should not report to IT.

Before the ever-cynical infosec crowd stops reading and throws this out the window, let me explain why I feel this way. Information security really has several key functions to perform – security operations (in whatever capacity that may take), security audit and analysis (could be related to compliance, but also ensuring policy is set and followed), and security-related governance, ie working with the entire organization to ensure information is protected with input from all business units and departments. Did you catch that last part? It’s important.

When infosec reports to IT, it is in essence, aligned with IT. It is tied to IT budgets, politics, reporting constraints, other priorities, etc. This is exactly wrong. With organizations’ data rapidly becoming the most important asset (behind their people, of course), the need to impartially manage the security and risk mitigation of that data should not be tied to IT…nor ANY ONE GROUP. What this means, in the most simple fashion, is that it is time for information security, with or without an official CISO or CSO, to report directly to the CEO and/or the board (preferably the latter). Here are a few common places I see infosec reporting into, and the most obvious pitfalls that relate to this governance/org structure:

• CFO/Finance: This is not too common, but I’ve encountered it a few times. The benefit is that you don’t report to IT, so the organization likely recognizes the potential conflict and/or need to separate information security from the larger quagmire that is Information Technology in general. However, CFOs have their own agendas, and although they may align with the organization as a whole in most cases, not always. Sometimes, CFOs can’t see the forest for the trees, and become blindly focused on saving money at all costs. This doesn’t jive with the world of information security, where you may well need budget unexpectedly due to changing threat landscapes.
• IT VP/Director/Manager: The most common case. I’ve already explained why this should change, but another point to consider is the mysteriously self-serving nature of IT organizations. Although they talk the talk about “supporting the business”, many IT professionals could honestly care less about business issues, and just want to play with the new toys. Bad, bad, bad for security in so many ways.
• Internal Audit (VP/Director): This actually tends to be the most closely aligned with the CEO/BoD in quite a few cases, as the internal audit department usually has some degree of impartiality. However, there’s a big caveat. Many audit departments have compliance at the top of their list, and compliance != security, as we all know. The biggest pitfall here is shortchanging security initiatives when they’re halfway completed since the checkbox is already checked on the auditor’s list.

I’m not much of one for absolutes, in just about anything really, but I am 100% behind this one. We need to see this trend happen – CISOs and CSOs need complete severance from ANY one group in the organization, as they have to work with them all. Closely aligned with much of IT, yes. Under its thumb? Not just no, but hell no.

PS – For the most hilarious security org chart EVAH check this out: http://www.themetalith.com/images/hsorgchartoriginal.gif

Information Security

You hear about a new, significant data breach in the news. What’s your reaction? Chances are, you’re a lot more desensitized to this than you were 3-4 years ago. Is this a good or a bad thing? Personally, I think there’s two ways to see it. First, the general public becoming desensitized to it. After the TJX breach, people happily handed their credit cards over at TJ Maxx and Marshall’s stores, so I’m not inclined to think these sort of announcements leads to actual consumer behavior changes in many cases. The other side of this is from an organization’s standpoint – safeguarding against data breaches is rapidly becoming “something you just kinda have to do”. Peer pressure? All the cool kids are doing it? We’ll see.

I took a look at the SC Magazine 2010 Data Breach survey found here. I’ll comment on a few points in this survey, as I am generally getting more and more skeptical of the validity of responses to these surveys, or generally questioning some of their usefulness. All images are taken directly from the survey page.

No shocker here. Compliance is the big driver. And it looks like “negative brand impact” is another one. However, this brings up a point, in my mind at least – why aren’t organizations doing this to “enhance security” or “adhere to security best practices”? Are all organizations like spoiled children who continually ask “Awww, do I HAVE to?” I understand money is involved, but it boggles my mind that companies do not understand the intrinsic need to not shit all over employees, customers, and partners by losing something entrusted to them.

Here’s another one that begs a question – how could even 7% of respondents NOT KNOW the answer to this? And “Yes, but not enough” seems like a cop-out answer that is “safe”. Either you have a cohesive plan, or you do not. Or you live under a rock and answer “Don’t Know”. Apparently, SC Magazine can reach you under said rock. Bravo.

Some additional nuggets of awesomeness (these graphs I only found in the magazine article):

• The company is preventing the data from being stolen, exposed, or lost. The responses? 91.2% agree, 4% disagree, and 4.5% neither agree or disagree. Two things – those numbers add up to 99.7% (where’s the other .3%?) and what kind of dumbass doesn’t have an opinion on the matter? To Mr. I don’t Know What the Hell is Going On…this Bud’s For You.
• Most and Least Helpful in detailing safeguards to protect customer data stored electronically. Holy nonsensical results, Batman – check this out!
  SOX was the most helpful to 28.1% in 2009. WHAT!!!! HOW? There IS no detail.
  GLBA was the most helpful to 16.3% in 2009. See comment above.
  HIPAA was the most helpful to 30.3% in 2009. Maybe you have no CLUE as a healthcare CISO, and you did a knee-jerk response on “your” compliance thingie. But really?
• Departments involved with this plan [breach response] to ensure that it is carried out properly. And HR is not even on the list. Internal folks don’t steal data?

So to bring this full circle with the opening paragraph and title of the post – did SC Magazine publish this useless bit of drivel to get some attention; in other words, use a “buzzword”? I say yes. For less “fluffy” infosec publishing, check out Bill Brenner and crew at CSO or Marcia Savage and the folks at Information Security. And yes, I know what they say about opinions.

Information Security

All IT professionals, regardless of specialty, face a number of challenges. Some, if not all, of these will affect most IT professionals in some way or another throughout their career:

• Lack of budget, IT is considered “overhead”
• Lack of respect from other business units, we’re only one step removed from R2-D2
• Lack of social skills, you spilled Mountain Dew on your too-short pants at the meeting
• Politics, the smiley well-dressed guy that wears too much cologne with the football analogies is better-liked than you

There’s also a bevy of more specific technical challenges that could plague IT folks (this list is almost infinite):

• You are trying to integrate new platforms into the environment
• You are trying to keep legacy systems afloat
• You are trying to communicate with the mainframe people, who DO in fact resemble R2-D2
• Upgrading/replacing systems
• Upgrading/replacing applications
• Managing users, scripts, logs, storage, networks, devices, etc etc etc.

Security people have a challenge that is 100% unique to their discipline: we have adversaries.

Now I know some of you in areas other than security will argue that you have adversaries, too. If security is even a tiny part of your job description, then you may be right. But the burden of fending off adversaries, both internal and external, falls squarely on the shoulders of information security teams. This lends an entirely new dimension to the concerns that plague everyone else:

• We cannot prioritize new functionality over security and stability. Ever. Lest adversaries take advantage of this and exploit vulnerabilities.
• Things like coding languages employed, platforms chosen, and applications deployed really need consideration not from what they offer us, but for how breakable they are.
• The concept of time is more relevant to us than anyone – our priorities can, and should, change as the threat landscape does. We have opponents, some coordinated and others standalone, actively trying to come up with new ways to cause us harm. This means we need to ensure these new methods they’re employing will be as ineffectual as possible, all the time.

This is an over-simplification at best. However, it’s an oft-overlooked factor that tends to be forgotten in the day-to-day dynamics of our interactions.

Information Security

So here we are. 2010 – a new, shiny year for things to be as %*# up as ever. <sigh>

OK, OK, that was pessimistic sounding. I do have some thoughts in general on this year in security. Here we go:

• Compliance will be a hot topic again this year. PCI is growing (MasterCard Level 2 peeps, talking to YOU). HIPAA is being changed, legislators are looking at breach disclosure and other topics, etc.
• DLP – love it or hate it – will get more mature and could become even more relevant with tie-ins to e-Discovery and compliance mandates. Trust me, I hate buzzwords more than most, but I think the notion of keyword searches and data fingerprinting have merit. Just early in the evolution.
• Howard Schmidt will do almost nothing. Oh sure, he may *talk* and stuff…but I don’t see anything changing this year. The government is just way too bureaucratic and bloated to change quickly. Not his fault, but I don’t think he’ll be the infosec savior by any means.
• Cloud computing will start to become more tangible, and we WILL have to secure that beeyotch.
• On a related (sort of) note, virtualization security will leave the “Chicken Little” phase and assume a normal place as YAICTS (Yet Another Infrastructure Component To Secure).
• We will have to really address some of the major “gray area issues” in security. For example, the whole PI license for computer forensics issue…WTF?
• Please please please please PLEASE – can we stop being such geeks and embrace risk management as the cornerstone of information security? I’m all for packets, hacking tools, and the like, too…but businesspeople still look at security folks often times like the 17 year-old that still plays with Legos. We talk all this bullshit about wanting to be more accepted with business folks, but many of us don’t really walk the walk. And no, I do NOT think metrics are the answer. <shudder>.

Some other general thoughts (not security):

• It is officially time to stop clipping your phone to your belt. You are not Batman. In fact, not even Robin.
• All movie critics suck. Why do we listen to them at all? I, for one, do not need my movies to be deep and meaningful all the time.

And off we go.

Information Security, Musings

We’ve all been a n00b at some point. I don’t care who you are, at some stage of the game you didn’t know much, or started a new gig, or tried something for the first time in full view of other people, or whatever the case may be – you’ve been a n00b. My friend Raf Los at HP, who I’ve known for years and has been through the security gamut just like me, posted a really interesting semi-rant the other day, check it out here. His observation? We crusty security types kind of suck at letting new people into the club. I don’t know about most of you (well, actually I do), I hated cliques in high school. The “you can’t sit at our lunch table” crowd. The “we’re having a massive party at XYZ’s house tomorrow night, and you can’t come” crowd. Yes, we all know who I’m talking about.

We’ve kind of become that crowd.

We’re not welcoming, or mentoring, or open-minded about new people coming in. Be honest – when was the last time someone arbitrarily asked you to guide them or lend some experience, where you really went out of your way to help them learn about infosec? This is, of course, for all you crusty types like me. Well, I was pretty lucky, I guess – I had a few really kick-ass people who let me ask a plethora of questions in the early days, and really bolstered my confidence and desire to keep forging ahead: Lampe, Herb, Jimmy the Slick…I’m talking to you.

So I have some advice for the n00bs. Those of you that aren’t truly n00bs anymore, you may want to check out an earlier post of mine called “Career Tips for Security Geeks.” Noobs, read this first, then read that one too. So here goes:

1. Please please please please PLEASE do not come out of school with a degree in “Information Assurance” or some other bullshit and tell me you are a security professional. You are not. You are either a) still my intern for another year until I have hazed you sufficiently, or b) the new anti-virus admin. Yes, I’m serious. Experience and technical skills count in security – I’ma let you finish, but first you will be starting at the bottom rung of the ladder if all you have is said IA degree and a will to learn. This leads us to…
2. Show me. Yep. Don’t talk theory, or concepts, or God forbid mention wretchedness like the Bell-LaPadula Model. Help me get security in order. Models don’t actually DO anything. They’re great for drunken whiteboarding sessions. And CISSP exams.

At this point, you’re thinking “Wow – Shack said he was going to help us out! He’s being one of those clique-ish types, though!”. Well…not really. That’s all the harshness I’m giving out, and there are good reasons for this advice. Well…one more, don’t get cocky. We’ve got way too many cocky folks already, and we’re trying to change the dynamic. So here’s some more practical advice for the n00bs:

1. Really, the best security people came from some other backgrounds. I really think you should spend a few years doing something else first. Coding, systems admin or network admin, DBA, etc. How can you secure stuff when you have no experience with it? Security isn’t all about IDS, pen testing, etc. The most important security is mitigating risk in regular old technology design and use, and you should have some hands-on time with THAT before you go saving the world.
2. Understand the following: TCP/IP, Cisco IOS, Windows admin (basic), Unix admin (basic). Pick a scripting language and endeavor to become a little bit proficient with it. Not a lot, that’s OK, but a little Perl-Fu or Python-Fu or Ruby-Fu or just Shell scripting-Fu can go a LONG way. These are basic skills. What about security? Re-read #1 above. Now do it again.
3. Allocate $500 and go visit your friend Amazon.com. Or better yet, roll Ramen noodle style and get used books by perusing titles at www.bestbookdeal.com. It rocks. What to buy? Hacking Exposed, latest edition. Counter-Hack Reloaded. Network Security Hacks (2e). Everything written by Richard Bejtlich. Malware (Skoudis and Zeltser). Security Engineering (2e). Applied Cryptography. This is a good start, look for others too – read them and keep going. Plan on spending $50-100 a month on books.
4. Understand how to lock down operating systems. Read the CIS benchmarks, DISA STIGs, and vendor guides from M$ and others. This is 101 stuff, and you need to know it WAY before you get to the “sexy” things like pen testing.
5. Become familiar with a packet sniffer of your choice. Wireshark is good. So is TCPdump. Both are free, and you can start breaking down packets and looking at them to see what the hell is going on.
6. Learn about Snort. Spend a month or so installing it, tweaking the configs, learning about rule creation, planning architecture and so on. Will it be your only IDS? Maybe, maybe not, but it’s the best for the $$$ and you need to learn.
7. Download the Backtrack security assessment toolkit from http://www.remote-exploit.org/backtrack.html. Load it up in a test network (repeat – test network. Did I mention test network?) and start running some tools to learn about scanning (nmap, hping3), vulnerability scanning (OpenVAS, maybe Nessus for local scans or if you have a license), and pen testing with Metasploit and exploits from Milw0rm and others.
8. Plan on going for the SANS GSEC certification. Forget about your CISSP or anything else right now, you need a solid set of fundamentals, and the SANS Security Essentials course is your best bet. I teach for SANS, full disclosure, but I endorse this with no bias whatsoever – it really is the best for newcomers to the field.

You now have the basics. Specialties, like code security, Web app security, pen testing, network security, etc all come a bit later. I won’t go into all that here, but you should be waking up every day with a fire under your ass. READ! Check out blogs and sites like darkreading.com, csoonline.com, packetstormsecurity.org, and others. Listen to Paul, Larry, John, Carlos and gang at www.pauldotcom.com to get in the spirit of things. And when you tell someone you are new to the field, and you have a legitimate question that they can help with, don’t let their lack of social skills get in the way. If they won’t help you, find some of us that aren’t worried about impressing the clique and we’ll help you. I got my OWN lunch table. And you’re invited. Unless you have, like, body odor or something. Then you’re not.

Information Security

So I was, as usual, inspired by everyday events and news to relate to the infosec community. In its own way, so many of the things we encounter day-to-day have parallels in our security community…but I digress. The topic of the day is “zero tolerance” policies. I recently read an article about a nice young man named Zachary Christie. He’s a good student, learning karate, and a Cub Scout. He’s also a criminal. Well, at least in the eyes of his school system. Why? He had the AUDACITY to bring a fork/spoon/knife camping utensil to school to use at lunch and show his classmates. Zachary, incidentally, is 6 years old. SIX.

I could understand a gentle reprimand. The ol’ “We have a policy here” talk. But Zachary didn’t get that. Nope, this hardcore 6-year old got suspended for 45 days! With the last week in solitary confinement for shanking a fellow inma…errrr, student! OK, I’m kidding about the last part. But the point should be clear – 45 days for this offense is actually punishing the student (very excessively), the parents (who will have to accommodate him with work schedules), and any rational, thinking person in the USA. That’s right, we’re all being punished because this makes us realize just how stupid we can be. And that hurts.

So. What about infosec? Well, we infosec people are policy creators and enforcers. Influencers, too, in many cases, but that’s less relevant here. I’ve had some really interesting conversations in the past with SANS students and Advisory Board members on this same topic. Some are all for draconian policies. Yaaar, matey, walk the plank! Others take a less heavy-handed approach. Which is right? Well, in my opinion (and we all know what THAT means), there are a few policy areas where we must be 100% black and white:

• Theft or intentional mishandling of sensitive data (PII, Trade Secrets, etc).
• Possession of child pornography.
• Intentional hacking or circumvention of access controls to do…anything.
• Espionage.

That’s it. Yep, really. Supporting evidence plays a big role in most (if not all) of these, so even these may not be completely cut and dry. Generally, though, it’s a safe bet to have clear violation rules in place for any of these. What about others, though? What about all those myriad policies that we have painstakingly written that everyone in the organization hates? Some make sense, sure, but there’s probably some that should be visited on a per-case basis. Many people in many organizations hate security people. Some of you will say “so what?”. I say – you’re losing the game. People WILL get around you one way or another, and if they hate you they will try 10 times as hard. I’m not advocating being wishy-washy, and there are plenty of reasons (governance, compliance, industry standards, etc) why certain policies should have less “wiggle room” than others. But if we always approach policy with a “my way or the highway” attitude, we are going to isolate ourselves even more in infosec, and that’s a tragedy. Just something to think about. </rant>

Information Security, Rants

I know this picture’s quality sucks, but it’s my favorite parody of the Homeland Security Threat Level system, so I wanted to include it. Much has been said about this deeply flawed system, and a Tweet from @AdrianLane of Securosis just got me thinking about this again. We’ve all made fun of this system for a huge number of reasons. The big one? It has no impact, representing the most ludicrous example of fearmongering ever put forth by the American government.

There’s some really telling insight here, though, that relates directly to why security is not wholly accepted by people at businesses everywhere. Here are a few corollaries we can draw:

1. The system makes no sense, intrinsically. The colors chosen are arbitrary, and so are the names. When we talk about threats in our environments and networks, we use terms that are really only meaningful to us in many cases, as well. What do those terms mean to the business? What does “Critical” mean versus “High”?

2. The system is meant to spread a bit of fear and keep people on edge. In that regard, it works for many Americans who aren’t clued in to the statistics around terrorist activity likelihood. In short, you’re more likely to be bitten by a rabid snail and die a horrible death than encounter even the slightest hint of terrorist activity in your lifetime. This, of course, is lost on those that actually supported the notion of “Freedom Fries”. Business leaders don’t like FUD, either. Imagine this exchange:

Security guy: We need an IPS!

Business manager: Why?

Security guy: People are attacking our network! We’re all going to die!

Business manager: How are we all going to die? What’s the risk to the business? What else do we have in place? What are the costs?

Security guy: We need an IPS! I need 1 million dollars!

Business manager: Hmmmm….

3. We don’t get enough information about WHY the level is assigned. Sure, this stuff is super-sensitive, but just telling me that things are worse without explaining why doesn’t help me to adapt my behavior in any way. In infosec, we may have the same problem. If I don’t explain WHY the missing patch is a problem, how will a business unit manager understand why I’m ranting about it? Aside from common sense, and reading the news, business managers cannot be expected to understand why security threats are serious, and why vulnerabilities that they can remediate have significant impact if left alone.

4. The worst issue, in my opinion: the Threat Level has absolutely zero actionable information. In other words, it doesn’t tell people what to do. What do you mean, exactly, by “be more vigilant”. How do I get “more vigilant”? Spy on my Muslim neighbors? Well, we make this mistake in infosec all the time. We often fail at helping people help themselves. A classic example of this is the report I generate with a vulnerability assessment. It says a problem is “Critical”. It states the problem, usually in a fairly abbreviated manner. I bring this to someone’s attention. But do I really explain WHY the problem is critical, with explicit descriptions of how it applies in our environment (problem #3, above)? And do I tell people how to fix the problem? And what the risks are of leaving it alone versus fixing? You get my point. It sounds ridiculous, but I have seen MANY reports from pen tests and other assessments that really don’t tell me how to fix the problem, or what happens if I don’t.

Information Security